Overall similarity, natural properties, and paraphrases by Guigon, Ghislain
Overall similarity, natural properties, and paraphrases
Ghislain Guigon
Published online: 6 February 2013
 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
Abstract I call anti-resemblism the thesis that independently of any contextual
specification there is no determinate fact of the matter about the comparative overall
similarity of things. Anti-resemblism plays crucial roles in the philosophy of David
Lewis. For instance, Lewis has argued that his counterpart theory is anti-essentialist on
the grounds that counterpart relations are relations of comparative overall similarity
and that anti-resemblism is true. After Lewis committed himself to a form of realism
about natural properties he maintained that anti-resemblism is true about the relations
of overall similarity that enter his counterpart theory and his analysis of counterfac-
tuals. However, in this article I argue that Lewis’s account of degrees of naturalness for
properties combined with his modal realism entails that anti-resemblism is false. The
Lewisian must amend Lewis’s system if she aims to benefit from the alleged virtues of
anti-resemblism. I consider two ways of amending it, neither of which is a free lunch.
Keywords David Lewis  Overall similarity  Natural properties  Modal realism
I might be likely to say that hippos are more similar to pigs than to whales. Hippos
and pigs are physically similar in several respects and belong to the group of even-
toed ungulates, which excludes cetaceans. But whales are the closest living relatives
of hippos—they diverged from cetaceans about fifty-five million years ago—and I
am interested in the evolution of species. Circumstances appear to alter our
judgments of comparative overall similarity (hereafter, overall similarity). As a
result, there is a prima facie case for the following thesis:
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Anti-resemblism. Independently of any contextual specification, there is no
determinate fact of the matter about the overall similarity of things (about the
truth value of the propositional content of judgments of overall similarity).
The opposite thesis is the following:
Resemblism. Independently of any contextual specification, there is a
determinate fact of the matter about the overall similarity of things (about
the truth value of the propositional content of judgments of overall similarity).
The debate between resemblism and anti-resemblism is analogous to the debate
between essentialism—the view that there is a determinate fact of the matter about
an object’s modal properties (about the truth value of de re modal propositions) not
relative to specifications—and anti-essentialism.1 But the two debates are more
closely related. For David Lewis has argued that his counterpart theory is anti-
essentialist on the grounds that anti-resemblism is true:
I am by no means offering a wholehearted defence of ‘‘Aristotelian essential-
ism.’’ For the essences of things are settled only to the extent that the counterpart
relation is, and the counterpart relation is not very settled at all. Like any relation
of comparative overall similarity, it is subject to a great deal of indeterminacy (1)
as to which respects of similarity and difference are to count at all, (2) as to the
relative weights of the respects that do count, (3) as to the minimum standard of
similarity that is required, and (4) as to the extent to which we eliminate
candidates that are similar enough when they are beaten by competitors with
stronger claims. Further, (…) the vagueness of the counterpart relation—and
hence of essence and de re modality generally—may be subject to pragmatic
pressures, and differently resolved in different contexts.2
Anti-resemblism plays crucial roles in Lewis’s philosophy. Relations of overall
similarity enter his system in two guises. First, there is the relation of overall similarity
between possibilia—x is similar to y and x is at least as similar to y as any other part of x’s
possible world—the so-called counterpart relation, that is a primitive of his counterpart
theory.3 According to Lewis, the indeterminacy of the counterpart relation adequately
accounts for the indeterminacy of the truth value of de re modal propositions.4 But also it
allows us to solve problems of material constitution without being committed to
numerically distinct coincident things or to the contingent identity of a thing with itself.5
Further, there is a relation of overall similarity among worlds—w is at least as similar to
w1 as is w2—that governs counterfactuals.
6 Lewis argues that the indeterminacy of this
relation adequately matches that of counterfactuals themselves.7
1 See e.g. Quine (1961, p. 155), Paul (2004).
2 Lewis (1983b, p. 42).
3 See Lewis (1983a, c).
4 See Lewis (1983b, pp. 42–43).
5 See Lewis (1983c, pp. 51–52).
6 See Lewis (1973, p. 48).
7 Lewis (1973, pp. 93–94).
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After Lewis committed himself to realism about natural properties in his ‘‘New
Work for a Theory of Universals’’ he maintained that anti-resemblism is true about
the relations of overall similarity that enter his counterpart theory and his analysis of
counterfactuals.8 However, in this article I shall argue that Lewis’s doctrine
of natural properties combined with his modal realism yields a specific version of
resemblism. The Lewisian must amend Lewis’s system if she aims to benefit from
the alleged virtues of anti-resemblism. I conclude by considering two ways of
amending it, neither of which is a free lunch.
1 Argument for anti-resemblism
Whenever things are similar in some respect they either share a common property or
have similar properties. Let us say that a property is a respect of similarity if and only if
sharing this property or having a property similar to it counts when evaluating whether
things are similar to each other. Likewise, a respect of dissimilarity is any property
such that lacking it or having a property dissimilar to it counts when evaluating
whether things are dissimilar. Lewis conceives of a relation of overall similarity as any
weighted resultant of respects of similarity and dissimilarity.9
Anti-resemblists like Goodman and the young Lewis typically maintain that each
of the following claims is true:
Abundance Properties are abundant.
Neutrality Independently of any contextual specification (for short, objectively),
properties are all on a par with regards to their ability to make for similarity and
dissimilarity, i.e. no property is more or less of a respect of similarity and
dissimilarity than any other property is.
Discrimination Overall similarity is discriminating, i.e. things are not equally
similar or dissimilar to each other.10
According to Lewis, any class of actual and otherworldly things is a property. Hence
properties are extremely abundant in his ontology.11 On the other hand, Neutrality
follows from the plausible assumption that properties, conceived of as classes of
things, have the same ontological status and are thus on a par with regards to their
ability to count in similarity-making. Finally, Discrimination is based on the
common-sense conviction ‘‘that we undeniably do make judgments of comparative
similarity’’.12 If Discrimination were false, there would be no point making such
judgments.
8 See Lewis (1986a, p. 252; 1986b, p. 52).
9 Lewis (1986b, pp. 53–54).
10 Goodman (1972, pp. 443–445) and Lewis (1973, pp. 91–92).
11 Lewis (1999a, p. 10).
12 Lewis (1986b, p. 53).
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Given Abundance any two things have in common and fail to share the same infinite
amount of properties as any further two things.13 If so, a necessary condition for
Discrimination to be true is that there be a selection between these properties that count
for similarity and dissimilarity and those that do not count. Given Neutrality we cannot
expect this selection to be an objective matter. Hence the required selection must be
grounded in the way things are represented when comparing them in judgments of
overall similarity. Since the way things are represented in judgments of overall
similarity is indeterminate and context-dependent, overall similarity is an indetermi-
nate and context-sensitive matter. Therefore, if Abundance, Neutrality, and Discrim-
ination are true, so is anti-resemblism.14
2 Realism about natural properties
Assuming that Discrimination is true resemblists can deny either Abundance or
Neutrality in order to block the preceding argument in favour of anti-resemblism.
Some resemblists follow David Armstrong who denies Abundance and maintains
that properties are sparse.15 But resemblists can agree with Abundance and instead
appeal to Lewis’s doctrine of natural properties in order to reject Neutrality. For,
according to Lewis’s doctrine, while most properties are ‘‘undiscriminating’’ and
have ‘‘nothing to do with similarity’’, there is an e´lite minority of properties, namely
the natural ones, that ‘‘capture facts of resemblance’’ and ‘‘make for qualitative
similarity’’.16 Since, according to Lewis, the difference between natural and merely
abundant properties is an objective one,17 it follows that properties are objectively
not all on a par with regards to their ability to make for similarity. Hence Neutrality
is false.
By committing himself to an objective difference between natural and merely
abundant properties Lewis thereby rejected Neutrality. Nevertheless, he maintained
that anti-resemblism is true. Indeed although the idea of natural properties as being
these properties that carve reality at the joints is closely linked to the belief in
objective similarity,18 realism about natural properties, and a fortiori the rejection of
Neutrality, is compatible with anti-resemblism. For if natural properties are still
quite abundant and are all on a par with regards to their ability to make for
qualitative similarity, Discrimination can fail. Yet natural respects of similarity are
very abundant in Lewis’s system. Take any arbitrary thing, a, and form the
disjunctive property F or G, where F is one of a’s most natural properties and G is
13 See Goodman (1972, pp. 443–444) and Lewis (1986b, p. 53).
14 Notice that this traditional argument in favour of anti-resemblism does not take into account the role
played by the similarity of properties in the evaluation of overall similarity. However, the similarity of
properties plays a central role in my argument to the conclusion that Lewis’s mature doctrine yields a
form of resemblism.
15 See e.g. Armstrong (1978, pp. 7–94).
16 See Lewis (1999a, p. 13; 1986a, pp. 59–60). Notice that in this article I follow Lewis in using
‘‘resemblance’’ and ‘‘similarity’’ synonymously.
17 See Lewis (1999a, p. 14).
18 See e.g. Sider (2011, pp. 1–8).
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an arbitrary perfectly natural property.19 Thus described, F or G is a fairly natural
property had by a. Then consider the infinity of possible worlds and the infinite
variations in perfectly natural properties, resident or alien, exemplified in distinct
worlds.20 This should give a rough idea of the large infinity of natural properties
alike to F or G that a shares with every F-thing. So the rejection of Neutrality does
not suffice to yield resemblism. However, I shall argue that Lewis’s doctrine of
natural properties combined with his modal realism entails resemblism.
According to Lewis, natural properties are not all on a par. Some are more natural
than others, and some are perfectly natural—they are such that no property is more
natural than them.21 Perfectly natural properties and relations carve reality at its
most natural joints and nowhere else, they are perfectly determinate and specific, the
sets of their bearers are ipso facto not at all miscellaneous, and there are just enough
of them to characterise things completely and without redundancy.22 Properties that
are not perfectly natural are definable in terms of Boolean operations on perfectly
natural ones. Boolean constructs are not all on a par: some are natural, some are not
natural, and, among the natural ones, some are more natural than others. Naturalness
comes by degrees, and degrees of naturalness are an objective matter.
But how does Lewis account for degrees of naturalness? Commentators
commonly account for degrees of naturalness as a mere function of the relative
complexity of the way less-than-perfectly natural properties are defined out of their
perfectly natural basis.23 But Nolan rightly acknowledges that this account is
unsatisfactory for the following reason.24 Some natural properties of the same
degree of complexity can be more or less gerrymandered. For instance, the property
definable as carmine or vermillion is less gerrymandered than the property definable
as carmine or azure. But if degrees of naturalness are a mere function of the relative
complexity of the way properties are defined out of their perfectly natural basis,
these properties are equally natural, which seems wrong.
However, these commentators misrepresent Lewis’s account. When Lewis
describes how universals should help us in recognising the natural properties, he
explicitly claims that less-than-perfectly natural properties are ‘‘made so by families
of suitable related universals’’.25 The nature of the suitable relation is made clear in
the attached footnote:
Here I assume that some solution to the problem of resemblance of universals
is possible, perhaps along the lines suggested by Armstrong in Universals, II,
pp. 48–52 and 101–131; and that such a solution could be carried over into a
19 See below on degrees of naturalness.
20 Lewis (1986a, pp. 159–165).
21 Lewis (1999a, pp. 13–14).
22 Lewis (1986a, pp. 59–60).
23 See, for instance, Hall (2010), Nolan (2005, p. 24), and Taylor (2006, p. 104).
24 Nolan (2005, p. 24).
25 Lewis (1999a, p. 13).
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theory of resemblance of perfectly natural properties, even if we take
naturalness of properties as primitive.26
The problem of resemblance of universals is the problem of accounting for the fact
that universals resemble one another to various degrees.27 So here Lewis explicitly
draws a link between less-than-perfectly natural properties and similarities to
various degrees between perfectly natural properties. Accordingly, the right account
of degrees of naturalness is two-dimensional: one dimension is a function of the
relative complexity of the way less-than-perfectly natural properties are defined out
of their perfectly natural basis; but there is a second dimension, which is a function
of the relative similarity of these perfectly natural properties (or of their
corresponding universals) in terms of which less-than-perfectly natural properties
are defined. Contrary to what commentators usually do, we should not focus on the
first dimension if we aim to understand Lewis’s account properly.
Lewis maintains that degrees of naturalness are an objective, context-insensitive, and
determinate matter. But Lewis partly grounds the hierarchy of degrees of naturalness of
less-than-perfectly natural properties in the relative similarity of these perfectly natural
properties in terms of which less-than-perfectly natural properties are defined. Therefore,
Lewis is committed to the claim that similarity of perfectly natural properties, and a
fortiori of less-than-perfectly natural properties that are defined in terms of perfectly
natural ones, is a context-insensitive and determinate matter.28 This means that, in
Lewis’s doctrine of natural properties, there are propositions of the following forms that
are determinately true independently of any contextual specification:
(1) F is more similar to G than it is to H;
(2) F is as similar to G as it is to H;
where ‘F’, ‘G’, and ‘H’ stand for natural properties.29 (1) is true for any values of
‘F‘, ‘G‘, and ‘H‘ such that F is similar to both G and H but is more similar to G than
to H. Intuitively, carmine is thus related to Vermillion and azure. But (1) is also true
for any values of ‘F’, ‘G’, and ‘H’ such that F is similar to G but not similar to
H. Intuitively, carmine is thus related to vermillion and triangularity. On the other
26 Lewis (1999a, pp. 13–14, note 7). Notice that by rejecting Armstrong’s structural universals in (Lewis
1999b) Lewis thereby rejected Armstrong’s solution to the problem of resemblance of universals, which
consists in conceiving of resembling universals as structural ones. However, this does not mean that
Lewis changed his mind on the link between degrees of naturalness and the similarity of perfectly natural
properties. He might have preferred another account of this link. For instance, an account that consists in
taking modal realist paraphrases for predications of similarity to properties (see below) as genuine
analyses.
27 ‘‘The different shapes resemble each other: they are all shapes. Furthermore, one (sort of) shape may
resemble another more closely than it resembles a third. Triangularity is more like quadrilaterality than it
is like circularity. (…) Our task is to give an account of resemblances such as these.’’ Armstrong (1978,
p. 101); see also Eddon (2007).
28 If the similarity of natural properties is not determinate or fine-grained, then the relative naturalness of
some natural properties is not fine-grained either, given the link Lewis draws between similarity of natural
properties and degrees of naturalness. But the Lewisian denies that the joints of nature are indeterminate.
So the Lewisian must agree that the similarity of natural properties is a determinate matter.
29 (1) and (2) could be taken as primitives or as derived from ‘‘F is at least as similar G as it is to H’’.
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hand, (2) is true for any values of ‘F’, ‘G’, and ‘H’ such that G and H are both
similar to F and are equally similar to F. One may think, for instance, that green is
thus related to yellow and blue. But (2) is also true whenever ‘F’, ‘G’, and ‘H’ are
such that neither of G and H is similar to ‘F’. This seems to be the case, for instance,
whenever F stands for a particular shade of colour, while ‘G’ and ‘H’ stand for
determinate masses, electric charges, shapes, etc.
But how is relative similarity of natural properties linked to relative naturalness
of less-than-perfectly natural properties? Lewis does not tell us. So we can only
speculate as to how relative similarity of natural properties should be linked to
relative naturalness in order to yield an adequate theory of natural properties.
Following Nolan, a theory of natural properties that fails to acknowledge that
carmine or vermillion is more natural than carmine or azure is inadequate. So I
propose that comparative similarity of natural properties should be linked to relative
naturalness of less-than-perfectly natural properties so as to make the following
true:
(*) If F is more similar to G than it is to H, the property definable as F or
G—alternatively, F and G—is more natural than the property definable as F or
H—alternatively, F and H;
where ‘F’, ‘G’, and ‘H’ stand either for perfectly natural properties or for properties
whose definitions in terms of perfectly natural properties are equally complex.
Given (*), carmine or vermillion turns out more natural than carmine or azure.
But (*) should be supplemented with the following principle in order to close
further gaps in the ordering of less-than-perfectly natural properties:
(**) If F is as similar to G as it is to H, the property definable as F or
G—alternatively, F and G—is as natural as the property definable as F or
H—alternatively, F and H
where ‘F’, ‘G’, and ‘H’ stand either for perfectly natural properties or for properties
whose definitions in terms of perfectly natural properties are equally complex.
Consider six natural properties whose definitions in terms of perfectly natural
properties are equally complex—F1, F2, F3, F4, G1, and G2—and assume the
following about them. F2 and F3 are both similar to F1 but are such that F2 is more
similar to F1 than F3 is. F3 and F4 are both similar to F1, and F3 is as similar to F1 as
F4 is. Finally, F1, G1, and G2 are such that neither of G1 and G2 is similar to F1. This
situation can be represented as follows (where points represent natural properties,
where the region within the circle represents the domain of properties that are
similar to F1, and where distance to F1 represents similarity distance to F1) (Fig. 1).
Since these properties are equally complex natural properties the view that
relative naturalness is a mere function of the relative complexity of properties yields
the following ordering: F1 or F2, F1 or F3, F1 or F4, F1 or G1, and F1 or G2 are
equally natural properties. This seems wrong. F1 or F2 carves reality at the joints
better than each of F1 or F3, F1 or F4, F1 or G1, and F1 or G2 does; F1 or F3 and F1
or F4 carve reality at the joints equally well and carve it better at the joints than both
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F1 or G1 and F1 or G2; finally, F1 or G1 and F1 or G2 carve reality equally badly at
the joints. Yet if the Lewisian assumes with Lewis that there is a link between
objective facts of comparative similarity for natural properties and degrees of
naturalness, she can maintain (*) and (**) in order to derive the desired ordering: F1
or F2 is more natural than each of F1 or F3, F1 or F4, F1 or G1, and F1 or G2; F1 or
F3 and F1 or F4 are equally natural and are more natural than F1 or G1 and F1 or G2;
F1 or G1 and F1 or G2 are equally natural.
3 Modal realist paraphrases
Lewis believes that his ontology of possible worlds obeys a principle of
completeness according to which, roughly, there is no gap in the logical space
and so every possibility is realised.30 And he claims that the completeness of the
modal pluriverse allows him to paraphrase away statements about the comparative
similarity of properties. Thus
(3) Red is more similar to orange than it is to blue
can be paraphrased as
(30) Some red thing is more similar to some orange thing than any red thing is
similar to any blue thing
in virtue of the close similarity between red and orange, where the things in question
need not be part of a same world.31 It is important to acknowledge that (30) is a
statement of overall similarity rather than a statement of similarity in some respect.
For a cross-world comparison is not required in order to account for (3) in terms of
comparative similarity of things with respect to colour. That (3) can be paraphrased
as (30) shows that such a paraphrase is available for any predication of comparative







Fig. 1 Comparative similarity
to F1
30 Lewis (1986a, p 86). Although it is doubtful that completeness can be achieved, I shall assume it for
the sake of my demonstration; see Divers and Melia (2002).
31 Lewis (1999a, pp. 16–17, 1986a, p. 13).
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(1) F is more similar to G than it is to H
can be paraphrased as
(10) Some F-thing is more similar to some G-thing than any F-thing is similar to
any H-thing
where these things need not be part of a same world. Likewise, I propose that the
modal realist can paraphrase
(2) F is as similar to G as it is to H
as
(20) For any F-thing there is a H-thing such that the former is as similar to any G-
thing as the latter is, and for any H-thing there is a F-thing such that the
former is as similar to any G-thing as the latter is.
where these things need not be part of a same world.
Now, according to Lewis’s doctrine of natural properties, some statements of the
forms of (1) and (2) are objective truths since objective facts of comparative
similarity for natural properties enter his account of degrees of naturalness. Suppose
that (3) is such a truth that is not relative to any context. Then (30) is an adequate
paraphrase for (3) only if (3) and (30) are true in the same conditions. So (30), if it is
an adequate paraphrase for (3), must be true not relative to any context. But (30)
expresses a determinate cross-world fact of overall similarity between things. So,
according to the link Lewis draws between objective facts of similarity between
properties and degrees of naturalness and given Lewis’s claim that statements of the
form of (1) can be adequately paraphrased as statements of the form of (10), there
are determinate facts of overall similarity between things that obtain independently
of any contextual specification. Likewise, some statements of the form of (2) are
objective truths. So if (20) is a correct paraphrase for (2), some statements of overall
similarity of the form of (20) are objective truths in Lewis’s system. But if so,
resemblism is true.
In order to illustrate this result, suppose that colour charges are incompatible
perfectly natural properties and that green charge is objectively more similar to blue
charge than it is to red charge. Assuming with Lewis that (10) is a correct
paraphrase pattern for statements of the form of (1), we can derive that
independently of any context some possible green quark, a, is more similar to
some possible blue quark, b, than any possible green quark is similar to any possible
red quark. So let us assume that c is a possible red quark that is a near duplicate of
a and b: a, b, and c are exactly similar in every perfectly natural respect except for
their colour charges.32 Given the close similarity between a and c, if one compares
32 Perfect duplicates share all their perfectly natural properties; near duplicates share almost all their
perfectly natural properties; see Lewis (1999a, pp. 25–29).
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a, b, and c in a context where no importance at all is assigned to colour charges one
should judge that b and c are equally similar to a (there is no reason to believe that
there can be no such context). If so, according to Lewis’s own claim about the
relativity of overall similarity to contexts, it is true in the latter context that b and
c are equally similar to a. However, my analysis reveals that, according to Lewis’s
realism about natural properties, this judgement must be false no matter what the
context is. For the assumed close similarity between green and blue charges entails
that independently of any contextual specification there is a determinate fact of the
matter about the overall similarity of a, b, and c: a is more similar to b than it is to c.
Similarly, it can be shown that since there are objective truths of the form of (2)
in Lewis’s system and given the assumption that (20) is a correct paraphrase pattern
for statements of the form of (2), there are objective facts of equal similarity
between possibilia. For instance, let us assume that F1, F2, and F3 are incompatible
perfectly natural properties such that, as an objective matter of fact, F1 and F2 are
equally similar to F3. Then let us assume that i, j, and k are exactly similar in every
perfectly natural respect except for the fact that i has F1, j has F2, and k has F3. Then
it is true independently of any contextual specification that i is as similar to k as j is.
4 Applications
If my reading of Lewis is correct, combining his doctrine of natural properties with
his modal realism yields a version of resemblism: independently of any contextual
specification, there is a similarity ordering of all things that is determined by
objective similarity orderings between perfectly natural properties. This result is not
without effect on Lewis’s applications of relations of overall similarity that rely on
their alleged indeterminacy.
Consider the quarks a, b, and c again but this time assume that a inhabits the
actual world, while the only inhabitants of w1 are a perfect duplicate of b, b
0, and a
perfect duplicate of c, c0. Since things could be the way they are in w1 it follows by
the modal realist principle of completeness that there is such a world as w1. I have
established that, on the assumption that green charge is objectively more similar to
blue charge than it is to red charge, the link between degrees of naturalness and the
similarity of perfectly natural properties combined with the assumption that (10) is a
correct paraphrase pattern for statements of the form of (1) entails that objectively
a is more similar to b than it is to c. Since b0 and c’ are perfect copies of respectively
b and c, b and b0 are equally similar to a, and so are c and c0. Therefore,
independently of any context a is more similar to b0 than it is similar to c0. If so
given Lewis’s account of the counterpart relation, it is an objective fact that b0 is a
counterpart of a in w1, whereas c
0 is not a counterpart of a in w1. Since b0 is a
counterpart of a, Lewis’s counterpart theory delivers the verdict that a is possibly
blue-charged. But since it is not the context, but objective facts of similarity
between perfectly natural properties, that determine that b0 is a counterpart of a,
‘‘a is possibly blue-charged’’ is true independently of any contextual specification.
So if my analysis of Lewis is correct, it shows that the addition of natural properties
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entails that facts about an object’s de re modal properties are not indeterminate,
contrary to Lewis’s own claim.33
Assuming that natural properties of worlds stand in objective relations of
similarity as well, a similar line of reasoning can be used to show that, given the link
Lewis draws between degrees of naturalness and the similarity of natural properties
and given the availability of modal realist paraphrases for statements of the form of
(1) and (2), the relation of overall similarity that governs counterfactuals is not as
context-sensitive as Lewis claims it is.34
5 Conclusion
The difficulty I explored in this article has emerged from the combination of the link
Lewis draws between similarity of perfectly natural properties and degrees of
naturalness with the assumption that (10) and (20) provide adequate paraphrase
patterns for statements of the form of (1) and (2) respectively. So the Lewisian who
aims to maintain anti-resemblism cum realism about natural properties can reject
either the link between similarity of perfectly natural properties and degrees of
naturalness or the availability of modal realist paraphrases for statements of the
forms of (1) and (2).
Suppose she rejects the link between similarity of perfectly natural properties and
degrees of naturalness and instead follows mistaken commentators in taking degrees
of naturalness to be a mere function of the relative complexity of the way less-than-
perfectly natural properties are defined out of their perfectly natural basis. Then, as I
have argued following Nolan, her account of degrees of naturalness is intuitively
inadequate. For intuitively the gerrymandered carmine or azure is not as natural as
the non-gerrymandered carmine or vermillion. If the Lewisian maintains the link
Lewis draws between similarity of perfectly natural properties and degrees of
33 Todd Buras (2006) has defended a similar conclusion. However, Buras’s argument is based on the
belief that, according to Lewis, shared perfectly natural properties (or shared maximally natural
properties) are the privileged respects of similarity; see Buras (2006, pp. 35–36). From this belief, Buras
concludes that the ontology assigns a privileged role to some specific relation of comparative overall
similarity which is wholly determined by the number of shared perfectly natural properties independently
of any contextual specification; see Buras (2006, pp. 32, 36, and 40, 41). But my reading of Lewis and the
model I gave show that the belief that shared perfectly natural properties are the privileged respects of
similarity is wrong in Lewis’s realism about natural properties. In Lewis’s system, similarity of perfectly
natural properties does not count less than commonality of perfectly natural properties in determining
objective facts of overall similarity—otherwise b0 and c0 would be equally similar to a, which is not the
case.
Notice that Buras would agree with me that, in the model I offered at the end of Sect. 3, it is true
independently of any context that i and j are equally similar to k. However, the reason why Buras would
maintain that i and j are equally similar to k is different from mine and does not fit with Lewis’s doctrine.
Buras would conclude that i and j are equally similar to k because i and j share the same number of
perfectly natural properties with k. By contrast, according to my reading of Lewis, i and j are equally
similar to k because i, j, and k are exactly similar in every perfectly natural respect except for the fact that
i has F1, j has F2, and k has F3 and because F1 and F2 are equally similar to F3.
34 The simplest model is the following. Consider three worlds, w1, w2, and w3 that differ in exactly one
natural respect: w1 has F
1, w2 has F
2, and w3 has F
3. Then suppose that, objectively, F1 is more similar to
F2 than it is similar to F3.
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naturalness, she can account for the fact that carmine or vermillion is more natural
than carmine or azure by embracing (*). But if she aims to drop this link, she needs
to find an adequate substitute for (*) and (**). Such a substitute is still to be
imagined.
On the other hand, if the Lewisian denies that statements of the form of (1) and
(2) can be adequately paraphrased in terms of statements of the form of (10) and (20),
then an alleged advantage of Lewis’s analysis of modality over standard modal logic
is lost. For, according to Lewis, while (30) offers a correct paraphrase for the
statement that a red thing could be more similar to an orange thing than any red
thing could be similar to any blue thing, this modalised comparative cannot be
expressed in standard modal logic.35 Moreover, the rejection of modal realist
paraphrases for statements of the form of (1) and (2) deprives nominalists of the
most satisfactory account of similarity statements between properties.36 I conclude
that the Lewisian cannot have the alleged virtues of anti-resemblism for free.
Acknowledgments Thanks to Alexander Bown, Fabrice Correia, Filipe Drapeau Contim, Stephan
Leuenberger, Kevin Mulligan, Fre´de´ric Nef, the members of eidos (the Genevan research group in
metaphysics), the audience and organisers of the conference ‘‘Another world is possible’’ on David Lewis
in Urbino, and the editors and reviewer at Philosophical Studies for helpful comments on this paper or the
ideas it presents.
References
Armstrong, D. M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism: A Theory of universals (Vol II). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Buras, T. (2006). Counterpart theory, natural properties, and essentialism. Journal of Philosophy, 103(1),
27–42.
Divers, J., & Melia, J. (2002). The analytic limit of genuine modal realism. Mind, 111, 15–35.
Eddon, M. (2007). Armstrong on quantities and resemblance. Philosophical Studies, 136(3), 385–404.
Goodman, N. (1972). Seven strictures on similarity. In N. Goodman (Ed.), Problems and projects (pp.
437–447). Indianapolis: Bobbs and Merrill.
Hall, N. (2010). Supplement on the natural/non-natural distinction to his ‘David Lewis’s metaphysics’. In
EN Zalta (Ed.), The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2010 edition). http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/lewis-metaphysics.
Lewis, D. K. (1973). Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D. K. (1983a). Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic. In D. K. Lewis (Ed.), Philosophical
papers (Vol. I, pp. 26–39). New York: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. K. (1983b). Postscripts to ‘‘counterpart theory and quantified modal logic’’. In D. K. Lewis
(Ed.), Philosophical papers (Vol. I, pp. 39–46). New York: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. K. (1983c). Counterparts of persons and their bodies. In D. K. Lewis (Ed.), Philosophical
papers (Vol. I, pp. 47–54). New York: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. K. (1986a). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Lewis, D. K. (1986b). Postscripts to ‘‘counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow’’. In D. K. Lewis (Ed.),
Philosophical papers (Vol. II, pp. 52–66). New York: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. K. (1999a). New work for a theory of universals. In D. K. Lewis (Ed.), Papers in metaphysics
and epistemology (pp. 8–55). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lewis D. K. (1999b). Against structural universals. In D. K. Lewis (Ed.), Papers in metaphysics and
epistemology (pp. 78–107). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nolan, D. (2005). David Lewis. Bucks: Acumen.
35 Lewis (1999a, pp. 16–17; 1986a, p. 13).
36 See for instance Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002, pp. 91–92).
398 G. Guigon
123
Paul, L. A. (2004). The context of essence. In F. Jackson & G. Priest (Eds.), Lewisian themes, the
philosophy of David K. Lewis (pp. 181–195). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Quine, W. V. O. (1961). Reference and modality. In W. V. O. Quine (Ed.), From a logical point of view
(2nd ed., pp. 139–159). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2002). Resemblance nominalism: A solution to the problem of universals. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Sider, T. (2011). Writing the book of the world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Taylor, B. (2006). Models, truth, and realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Anti-resemblism 399
123
